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1  Introduction and Outline
Language origin and evolution studies face two major prob-
lems (Part 2). Scholars study numerous language-associ-
ated phenomena because they disagree on what language 
is and how it evolved (Sect. 2.1); and at present, no crite-
ria exist to choose amongst opposing theories (Sect.  2.2). 
Consequently, obtained data and results remain juxtaposed, 
and a unified theory on language and its evolution remains 
absent.
Here, we circumvent the definitional problem and show 
how applied evolutionary epistemology (AEE) provides a 
uniform methodology for evolutionary linguists (part 3). 
AEE (Gontier 2010a, b, 2012) is a methodology derived 
from how Universal Darwinists study how evolution occurs 
by means of natural selection, but it also incorporates theo-
ries associated with an extended synthesis. AEE defines 
evolution as the phenomena where units evolve at levels of 
an ontological hierarchy by mechanisms.
Implementing AEE into evolutionary linguistics, there-
fore, involves a systematic search for the units, levels, and 
evolutionary mechanisms involved in LE (part 4). I intro-
duce three heuristics whereby we can identify, examine and 
evaluate all three and I give an in-depth analysis of the unit-
heuristic (part 5). I end by pointing out future prospects for 
research (part 6). For an in-depth analysis of the level- and 
mechanism-heuristic, I refer the reader to Gontier (2017).
Abstract Universal Darwinism provides a methodology 
to study the evolution of anatomical form and sociocul-
tural behavior that centers on defining the units and levels 
of selection, and it identifies the conditions whereby natu-
ral selection operates. In previous work, I have examined 
how this selection-focused evolutionary epistemology may 
be universalized to include theories that associate with an 
extended synthesis. Applied evolutionary epistemology 
is a metatheoretical framework that understands any and 
all kinds of evolution as phenomena where units evolve 
by mechanisms at levels of an ontological hierarchy; and 
it provides three heuristics to search for these units, levels 
and mechanisms. The heuristics are applicable to language 
and sociocultural evolution, and here, we give an in-depth 
analysis of how the unit-heuristic can be implemented into 
language origin and evolution studies. The importance of 
developing hierarchy theories is also more fully explained.
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2  Two Problems for Evolutionary Linguistics
We first analyze the definitional problem and then exam-
ine the methodological problem that confronts evolutionary 
linguists.
2.1  The Definitional Problem
Evolutionary linguistics today combines data from linguis-
tics, anthropology, primatology, archaeology, neurology, 
and psychology. Scholars disagree on what language is 
and this impacts how they study its evolution. Some under-
stand language as a unique human capacity, others say it 
evolved from animal communication systems, and still oth-
ers assume the existence of an intermediate protolinguistic 
stage.
Bio-linguists define language as an individual and 
inborn neurocognitive capacity (Lenneberg 1964). Chom-
sky (1999) and co-workers (Berwick and Chomsky 2016) 
divide this faculty of language into three components; the 
sensorimotor system that enables language output (speech 
or gesturing), the conceptual-intentional system that pro-
vides the input for language (thought that underlies the 
lexicon), and the cognitive capacity to merge that enables 
recursion (that characterizes universal grammar). Merge 
is defined as the basic property of human language, and 
recursion defines the faculty of language in the narrow 
sense (FLN). The other two systems are part of the faculty 
of language in the broad sense (FLB), and components of it 
are shared with other animals (Hauser et al. 2002). The dis-
tinction between the FLN and FLB is a reinterpretation of 
what Chomsky originally called I-(nternal) and E-(xternal) 
language. Both the FLB and FLN are recognized to be part 
of an “organism-internal environment” that they oppose 
to an “external environment” that is divided into “social”, 
“cultural”, “physical”, and “ecological” layers or realms. 
With this distinction, they take the hierarchical nature of 
reality into account.
In humans, the FLB is said to enable a “secondary sys-
tem of communication” (Berwick and Chomsky 2016: 
64), but for Chomsky, language primarily facilitates inter-
nal thought. E-language is traditionally studied by dia-
chronic linguists, anthropologists and psychologists. These 
have shown that, although words might be inventions of 
an individual’s conceptual-intentional system, for these 
to become learned by others and integrated into a soci-
ety’s lexicon, sociocultural interaction and transmission 
is required. E-language-related phenomena including lan-
guage acquisition, variation, change, and diffusion there-
fore often require group-level explanations that go beyond 
I-Language.
(Animal) communication systems are also defined dif-
ferentially. Weaver and Shannon’s (1963) model defines 
communication as the transfer of a signal/ message/ 
information between a sender and  a receiver. A sig-
nal/ message/ information may refer broadly to emo-
tions, facial expressions, vocal calls and gestures of 
both human and other animals (Darwin 1872), or it may 
refer specifically to co-verbal gesturing (Goldin-Meadow 
2007) or body language that accompanies modern lan-
guage. And although animal communication systems can 
be understood narrowly as signals (Maynard Smith 1974; 
Krebs and Davies 1978), they can also encompass behav-
ioral repertoires that include maternal bonding (Altmann 
1974) or grooming (Dunbar 1998). Animal communica-
tion systems are often species-specific, but they also con-
vey meaning interspecifically (in predator–prey relations, 
for example); and Witzany (2014) has recently drawn 
attention to intra-organismal communication that occurs 
between different bodily organs or between a host and its 
microbiome.
Finally, beyond language and communication, a rising 
number of scholars today investigate protolanguage. Origi-
nally, the term referred to a hypothetical stem obtained 
from comparing manuscripts, or it denoted a hypothetical 
urlanguage acquired from using internal reconstruction 
methods (Schleicher 1861–1862). Today, it also refers to a 
hypothesized but considered real communicative/linguistic 
system used by early modern humans and perhaps other 
hominins (Bickerton 1990; Tallerman 2011; Wray 1998).
Scholars thus continue to disagree on the nature of 
(animal) communication, proto-language, and language 
and proposed definitions are often intensional/functional, 
exclusive, outdated, and incongruent with actual scientific 
practices. Definitions are intensiona/functional because 
they seek to find the essential or functional characteris-
tics of language. They are exclusive because they single 
out one phenomenon to the exclusion of all others (e.g. 
the biological capacity versus the sociocultural transmis-
sion of language versus language as a system). They are 
outdated because some definitions are over 100 years old 
(e.g. de Saussure’s (1916) language, langue, and parole), 
and they were often formulated within a non-evolutionary 
context (e.g. Shannon–Weaver’s model). Instead, defini-
tions remain based upon classic dichotomies including the 
innate-acquired or biological–cultural, animal–human or 
continuity–discontinuity, or historical diffusion–biological 
evolution divides. Finally, definitions are incongruent with 
actual scientific practices because scholars do not study 
communication, protolanguage or language as monolithic 
wholes and from within a specific biological, neurologi-
cal, cultural or linguistic domain. Instead, they realize that 
the entities referred to are heterogeneous. That is why they 
focus on a wide variety of genetic and anatomical features, 
neuro-cognitive capacities, individual and group behavioral 
patterns, or the properties of linguistic systems.
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Examples of the latter include specific genes such as the 
FOXP2 or MICROCEPHALIN gene (Jackson et  al. 2002; 
Lai et  al. 2000, 2001; Vargha-Khadem et  al. 2005); the 
anatomy of orofacial muscles (Gaspar et  al. 2014), hand 
bones (Marzke 1999), and the supra-laryngeal vocal tract 
(Fitch 2000; Lieberman 2007), that, respectively, permit 
facial expressions, gesturing and articulate speech; brain 
regions such as Broca and Wernicke’s area and specific 
neurons such as mirror neurons (Fadiga et al. 2000); neuro-
cognitive capacities including memory, planning, theory of 
mind, and empathy (Christiansen and Chater 2016; Corbal-
lis 2002); individual and sociocultural behavioral patterns 
such as pointing, imitation, mimesis, pantomime, or learn-
ing and teaching (Dor 2015; Leavens et  al. 2005; Racine 
et al. 2014; Goldin Meadow 2007; Zlatev 2014); and prop-
erties of human languages, including grammar (enabled by 
recursion), and the lexicon (characterized by displacement) 
(Chomsky 1965).
The question, therefore, becomes: Given that we disa-
gree, how can we circumvent defining language and still 
study its evolution? Before we answer this question, we 
hone in on how the diverse definitions of language impact 
the various methodologies used to examine LE.
2.2  The Methodological Problem
Because there are so many disciplines involved, there 
exist plenty of fields and  methodologies to examine how 
the diverse phenomena associated with language evolved. 
These include:
1. Evolutionary developmental phenotype to genotype 
linkage studies in so far as anatomical features, neuro-
cognitive capacities, and behavioral traits are reduc-
ible to genes, scholars investigate this genetic variation 
and its transmission modes (Misyak and Christiansen 
2011);
2. (Comparative) paleontological research on hominin 
anatomy (Tattersall 2014; Wood and Grabowski 2015);
3. (Comparative) neurological and cognitive studies that 
investigate the (homologs of) language-associated 
brain areas (Corballis 2002; Fadiga et al. 2000);
4. (Comparative) sociocultural transmission studies: lan-
guage change and many of the behavioral and socio-
cultural traits that associate with language cannot 
be reduced to biological evolution (genes, anatomy 
or neurocognition), but we can study their sociocul-
tural transmission modes; work that is facilitated by 
historical/diachronic and comparative linguistics as 
well as linguistic and cultural phylogenetics where 
scholars make use of phylogenetic tree and network 
models to map the diffusion and descent of languages 
or cultural artifacts (Atkinson et  al. 2008; Mendoza 
Straffon 2016; Gray and Jordan 2000); and
5. Classic linguistic studies that demonstrate the peculi-
arities of human language (Chomsky 1965).
The above-listed fields and  methodologies are further 
facilitated by help sciences, including:
6. Ontogenetic research encompassing brain imaging 
studies (Christiansen and Chater 2016) and compara-
tive psychological research on normal and pathological 
human beings;
7. Comparative primatological sciences (Gontier and 
Pina 2014; Leavens et  al. 2005; Matsuzawa 2001; 
Racine et al. 2014);
8. Computational simulations (Tamariz and Kirby 2016; 
Kirby 2016; Steels 2011) and in  vivo experiments on 
iterated learning (Tamariz and Kirby 2016) and trans-
mission chain studies (Mesoudi and Whiten 2008);
9. Biological and cultural evolutionary theories that 
explain the mechanisms of evolutionary change.
(1–3) involve evolutionary biological studies that enable 
genealogical descent studies on how language-related phe-
nomena evolve and spread amongst individuals, group and 
species (Croft 2000; Mufwene 2001). (4) Involves cultural 
evolution studies that enable geographic and ecological dif-
fusion studies on how behavioral and group traits associ-
ated with language, and the languages themselves, change/
evolve and spread. And (5) encompasses linguistic studies 
that do not necessarily involve an evolutionary outlook, 
because we may study languages as closed synchronic 
systems.
Distinguishing biological from sociocultural evolution 
(9) has brought diversity into how we understand evolu-
tion. Some argue that cultural evolution follows Lewontin’s 
(1970) Darwinian principles (Mesoudi and Whiten 2008), 
others say that biological and symbolic evolution co-evolve 
(Deacon 1997), and still others explain cultural evolution 
as a process distinct from biological evolution because the 
former can be directed or guided while the latter is blind 
(Boyd and Richerson 1985). Though these distinctions 
have proven useful, for they demonstrate that there are dif-
ferent kinds of evolution, it complicates clear identifica-
tion of what domain, the biological, the cultural, or both, is 
involved in the evolution of specific traits.
It furthermore complicates immediate linkage of traits 
to the mechanisms whereby they evolve. Scholars used to 
straightforwardly endorse that language is an adaptation 
and that it evolved by means of natural selection (Pinker 
and Bloom 1990). But beyond natural and sexual selec-
tion (Pinker 2003), a myriad of mechanisms have now 




(Dor 2015; Chomsky and Berwick 2016), the ratchet effect 
(Tomasello 2000); the Baldwin effect (Lachapelle et  al. 
2006); hybridization, etc. And from within cultural and 
linguistic phylogenetics, scholars have, besides classic pat-
terns of gradual descent with modification, detected pat-
terns of punctuated equilibria, drift and reticulations or 
horizontal exchange in how languages diffuse and diversify 
(Atkinson et al. 2008; Gray and Jordan 2000; Shijulal et al. 
2010; Mendoza Straffon 2016).
Finally, the other help sciences (6–8) provide what Botha 
(2006: 132) calls windows of LE. A window is a phenom-
enon itself distinct from LE, that enables to draw inferences 
on how language possibly evolved. Examples include com-
puter simulations, experiments, contemporary home signs, 
language acquisition, Pidgin and Creole languages, or cul-
tural transmission of tool use by chimpanzees. But though 
computational simulations and in  vivo experiments are 
helpful in generating and testing hypotheses on a possible 
context of use of certain traits, they are potentially biased 
toward certain premises. And inferences on evolution from 
ontogenetic (comparative) studies assume the principles 
of continuity and uniformity. That is, we must assume that 
the present is like the past. But biologists have long shown 
that ontogeny does not necessarily recapitulate phylogeny 
(see Gontier for a review 2006), and also environmental 
conditions might change over time. Simulating the original 
sociocultural and biological conditions, therefore, prove 
difficult (Gontier 2015). And per definition, windows differ 
from the actual units, levels and mechanisms wherefrom 
language evolved. Finding these is the main focus of the 
meta-methodology proposed here.
3  Toward a Unified Methodology: Applied 
Evolutionary Epistemology
Applied evolutionary epistemology (AEE, Table  1) is a 
metatheoretical framework that understands evolution as 
the process whereby units evolve at certain levels of an 
ontological hierarchy by one or more mechanisms; and 
it provides three heuristics that enable the identification, 
examination, and evaluation of phenomena as either three 
(Gontier 2010b, 2012).
I briefly explain how this universal methodology derives 
from how evolutionary biologists and evolutionary episte-
mologists study evolution as it occurs by means of natural 
selection; and I go on to demonstrate how AEE differs from 
the latter because it embraces an extended synthesis. Con-
trary to the Modern Synthesis, that defines evolution by 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection, AEE does not single 
out one evolutionary theory. Instead, it remains neutral on 
the mode of evolution. It furthermore recognizes unit, level, 
and mechanism plurality as well as the need to establish an, 
or multiple ontological hierarchies.
3.1  Roots of AEE in the Units and Levels of Selection 
Debate and Evolutionary Epistemology
Evolutionary epistemology (EE) (Campbell 1974a; Bradie 
1986) developed from research on how natural selec-
tion theory, that explains anatomical form, can, in addi-
tion, explain the evolution of sociocultural, linguistic and 
cognitive behavior. EE associated with the rise of ethol-
ogy, sociobiology and comparative psychology which are 
disciplines that now evolved into the current field of evo-
lutionary psychology. It also associates with evolutionary 
biology and philosophy of biology, where scholars have 
investigated how natural selection theory can be “universal-
ized” (Dawkins 1983; Cziko 1995).
The founders of the Modern Synthesis understood evo-
lution as the phenomenon where organisms (the unit) 
become naturally selected (the mechanism) by the environ-
ment (the level) if they are adapted to it (the conditions), 
while maladaptive organisms are naturally weeded out (the 
assumptions).
How then, have Neo-Darwinians defined these units, 
levels and the conditions whereby natural selection occurs? 
The answer is, differentially, because they never reached a 
consensus view. In fact, attempts to define either brought 
forth what we today call the units (Lewontin 1970) and lev-
els (Brandon 1982) of selection debate.
Adherents of the Modern Synthesis take the phenotype 
as the basic unit of selection (Mayr 1997). But Dawkins 
(1982: 162) has argued that genes are the “true” units of 
selection because only these have “fecundity, longevity 
and copying-fidelity”. The properties of genes and phe-
notypes, as units of selection, have since been “universal-
ized” into replicators, i.e. “any entity in the universe of 
which copies are made” (Dawkins (1982: 162), and inter-
actors, i.e. “an entity that directly interacts as a cohesive 
whole with its environment in such a way that replication 
is differential” (Hull 1980: 381). And Griesemer (2000: 
Table 1  Applied evolutionary 
epistemology Universal skeleton of evolution
Evolution occurs when unit/s evolve at level/s of an ontological hierarchy by mechanism/s
A derived universal evolutionary methodology
Studying evolution involves a search for units, levels and mechanisms, and locating them in an ontological 
hierarchy
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363) has argued that most behavioral or cultural units 
of selection are reproducers (and see also Oyama et  al. 
2001). In sum, scholars originally tried to single out one 
true unit of selection, that they defined intensionally by 
listing essential properties, but today we find evidence 
for the ontological existence of all these entities. Conse-
quently, we now need to recognize unit-pluralism: differ-
ent entities can be units of selection.
The locus or level where a unit is subjected to natural 
selection is traditionally defined as the environment. This 
also used to be understood as a homogenous structure, one 
that coincides with the outer physical environment. But 
here too, evolutionary scholars have introduced a more 
nuanced view. The outer environment is not only made up 
of non-living physical entities such as rocks, soil or water, 
it is also roamed by other organisms, where through preda-
tor–prey relationships, organisms increase or decrease 
the selection of other organisms (Van Valen 1971). And 
beyond the external biotic or abiotic environment, organ-
isms also have an inner environment that is heterogeneous 
(Lewontin 1970), simply because organisms are composi-
tional structures made up of different body parts. A gene, 
for example, may be active in the heart but not the lungs, 
and this implies the presence of a selection process of the 
unit at certain but not other levels. Consequently, we need 
to recognize level-pluralism: units may evolve at different 
levels, and these levels are nowadays studied from within 
multilevel selection theory (Okasha 2005).
Turning to the conditions whereby natural selection 
operates, Darwin’s evolutionary theory works on several 
observable principles. Organisms display variation in 
traits, offspring resemble their parents, and traits facilitate 
or disable survival and reproduction. Lewontin (1970) uni-
versalized these conditions or Darwinian principles into 
differential variation, inheritance and differential fitness. 
The Darwinian principles provide a logical skeleton or a 
heuristic of how natural selection operates, and it enables 
an expansion of Darwinian theory to research domains 
that surpass the study of biological form. Variation can be 
genetic but also behavioral or cognitive; behavioral “inher-
itance” does not require germline transmission because it 
happens through sociocultural transmission (learning and 
teaching); and differential fitness can be quantified by the 
number of offspring or by the success whereby behavio-
ral traits remain part of a cognitive or cultural repertoire. 
Besides Lewontin’s logical skeleton, we may also think of 
evolution by means of natural selection as a process that 
operates by a “blind variation and selective retention” heu-
ristic, as Campbell (1974a), the founder of evolutionary 
epistemology, suggested. When we cannot point out units 
that vary blindly and that are selectively retained, then evo-
lution by means of natural selection does not occur simply 
because the conditions for change are absent.
Turning to the assumptions, Darwin’s selection the-
ory assumes a struggle for existence due to a scarcity of 
resources and therefore a more likely elimination of the 
unfit, before they reach reproductive maturity. Adaptive 
organisms are attributed better fitness values because they 
spread their inheritable traits to future generations. Fitness 
thus provides a quantum whereby we measure adaptation.
The identification of units and levels of selection, and 
the identification of the working order or conditions of 
change whereby natural selection operates, function as 
the criteria whereby scholars argue that an entity evolves 
by means of natural selection. It also enables an imple-
mentation of natural selection theory into the sociocultural 
domain. But most of all, the recognition of unit and level 
plurality elicits the need to build hierarchy theories of evo-
lution (Hull 1980) that deal with the ontological layered-
ness of the phenomena under study.
Genes, for example, can be selected at the genomic or 
organismal level during gene regulation, or they become 
selected at a group level (sex-linked genes, for example, 
only spread amongst specific members of a group, males 
or females), or at a species level (when they become fixed 
in a species, an example is the FOXP2 gene to which we 
return later). Organisms, groups, and species together form 
an embedded genealogical hierarchy where the entities are 
linked through common descent (Tëmkin and Eldredge 
2015). This hierarchy mimics artificial classification sys-
tems, with that important difference that we understand 
the genealogical hierarchy as composed of real entities, i.e. 
“biological individuals” that occupy space and time (Ghis-
elin 1975).
But genes can also become de/activated (and thus de/
selected) by viruses or other species, and then the change 
is ecologically induced. Beyond the genealogical hierarchy, 
especially Tëmkin and Eldredge (2015) therefore differenti-
ate an ecological hierarchy that is made up of organisms, 
populations, communities, ecosystems and the biosphere. 
While the genealogical hierarchy focuses on the  genetic 
transmission of information, the ecological hierarchy 
allows for more general processes of matter and energy 
exchange. Finally, gene-regulation can be induced by abi-
otic factors, including carcinogens such as ultraviolet light.
Much debate exists on how we should define evolution-
ary hierarchies. Are they singular (Okasha 2005), dual 
(Tëmkin and Eldredge 2015) or multiple? Is causation 
reducible to the bottom (genetic) level (Dawkins 1982), 
or do processes of downward causation exist (Campbell 
1974b), where upper levels alter lower levels of the hier-
archy? The Baldwin (1896) effect, for example, enables an 
explanation, in Darwinian terms, of how social heredity 
occurs and this can, in turn, alter the trajectory of biologi-
cal evolution. In other words, the sociocultural environment 




been proven in what regards lactose tolerance at a genetic 
level that is due to prolonged consumption of milk at a cul-
tural level, because of pastoralism.
When a dual, or multiple hierarchies are adhered to, the 
question becomes whether and how the hierarchies interact. 
How do hierarchies evolve and how do transitions between 
levels occur (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995)? Pro-
viding answers to these questions is very much work in 
progress, but existing research demonstrates that develop-
ing adequate hierarchy theories is necessary just because 
there exists unit and level pluralism.
Finally, the layeredness of the evolutionary process 
makes us realize that entities may switch status. An organ-
ism, for example, may be a unit of selection at the level of 
the environment, but it may also be a level where replica-
tors are selected. No principle of exclusivity can be main-
tained, units may be levels at one scale, and levels may be 
units at another.
Recapitulating, studying how evolution occurs by natu-
ral selection has involved research into the entities or units 
(replicators, interactors, reproducers) and the levels where 
these entities evolve. The recognition of unit- and level 
plurality, and considering that units may be levels at one 
scale and levels may be units at another scale, necessitates 
hierarchy theories that explain how units and levels interact 
and relate to one another. And beyond the units and levels 
of selection debate, scholars have also sought to define the 
principal conditions whereby selection operates, conditions 
they have often defined in the form of a heuristic, princi-
ples, or a logical skeleton. This defines the basic Neodar-
winian methodology and in the next part, we will derive 
from this an even more universal methodology to study 
evolution, one that from within the extended synthesis also 
recognizes mechanism plurality.
3.2  Defining Units, Levels, and Mechanisms 
from Within an Extended Synthesis
Beyond natural selection, scholars working from within 
an extended synthesis (Pigliucci 2007) have identified 
numerous additional mechanisms and processes whereby 
evolution occurs, including drift (Kimura 1968), and 
hybridization, hereditary symbiosis, and lateral gene trans-
fer (for an overview see Gontier 2015). Macroevolutionary 
scholars have detected patterns of punctuated equilibria 
that are induced by a variety of mechanisms (for an over-
view see Serrelli and Gontier 2015). And from within evo-
lutionary developmental schools (Hallgrîmsson and Hall 
2011), scholars have demonstrated that organisms display 
properties such as developmental plasticity, epigenetic 
inheritance, and genetic assimilation that all may induce 
evolutionary change. These theories have identified new 
units and levels, not of natural selection per se, but units 
and levels of those particular mechanisms  and processes 
(Gontier 2010a, b, 2012).
Put negatively, definitions of units and levels of evolu-
tion are often biased toward natural selection theory. Put 
positively, we need not throw away the baby with the bath-
water, because the endeavor whereby Neo-Darwinians have 
tried to universalize natural selection theory can and is set-
ting the example for how we can now examine and univer-
salize extended evolutionary theories. Scholars researching 
an extended synthesis continue to search for units whereon 
and levels whereat mechanisms are active, and they also try 
to identify the conditions whereby non-selectionist mecha-
nisms induce evolutionary change.
On a meta-level, we can derive an even more universal 
skeleton and methodology from how scholars study evolu-
tion. AEE’s universal skeleton states that when evolution 
occurs, units evolve at certain levels of an ontological hier-
archy by certain mechanisms. This appears to be a mini-
mum requirement for any kind of evolution to occur, and in 
previous work, I have proposed a more pragmatic and neu-
tral way whereby we can identify units, levels, and mech-
anisms of any and all kinds of evolution (Gontier 2010a, 
b). Instead of providing intensional/essential definitions of 
either three (as has been done in the past), I propose two 
alternative ways to define phenomena as units, levels, and 
mechanisms of evolution. One definition is extensional, the 
other ostensive (Table 2).




Extensional/denotative definition Ostensive definition (definition by pointing)
Unit What The entity that evolves X is a unit if one can minimally point out one level where x evolves, and one mecha-
nism whereby x evolves





How The means/conditions whereby 
evolution occurs
X is a mechanism if one can minimally point out one unit that evolves at one level by 
means of x
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Extensional definitions say what a phenomenon denotes. 
In our case, a unit stands for the entity that evolves, the 
level designates the locus or place where the unit evolves, 
and the mechanism indicates the conditions whereby 
the change of units at levels occurs. The extensional defini-
tions furthermore link to specific epistemic questions. The 
unit is the what of evolution, the level is the where, and the 
mechanism is the how.
Ostensive definitions encompass an identification of the 
phenomenon referred to by demonstrating its existence. 
This often involves pointing out where phenomena belong 
in an ontological hierarchy. As such, a unit can be identi-
fied by pointing out the level where and the mechanism 
whereby it evolves; a level can be identified by pointing out 
a unit that evolves at this level and a mechanism whereby 
this unit evolves at that level; and a mechanism is recog-
nized as such when we can point out one or more units 
whereon it is active at certain levels.
AEE recognizes unit, level and also mechanism plu-
rality. Biological and sociocultural evolutionary scholars 
are currently demonstrating that units (the elements that 
evolve) and levels (the place where evolution occurs) are 
often simultaneously subjected to more than one evolution-
ary mechanism (the conditions whereby evolution occurs). 
Theorizing on mechanisms also no longer justifies adher-
ence to any principle of exclusivity. A gene, for example, 
that is subjected to positive selection at both the genetic 
and environmental level, can also become transmitted hori-
zontally, by hybridization or lateral gene transfer.
4  Implementing AEE into Evolutionary 
Linguistics
We first examine how implementing AEE into evolution-
ary linguistics need not start from scratch because schol-
ars have, albeit often implicitly, already tackled questions 
on hierarchies, units, levels, and mechanisms. Secondly, we 
present the three AEE-heuristics that enable a more explicit 
identification, examination, and evaluation of units, levels, 
and mechanisms of LE, and we explain how they will ena-
ble to establish hierarchies of LE.
4.1  Possible Units, Levels, and Mechanisms of LE
Chomsky and co-workers’ I- and E-language distinc-
tion has dealt with questions of units, levels, and hier-
archies. I-language contains the FLN and FLB and is 
part of an “organism-internal environment,” while they 
divide the “external environment” into a hierarchy made 
up of social, cultural, physical and ecological layers or 
realms (levels). Amongst examples of the FLB-sensory-
motor system, Hauser et al. (2002: 1573) included vocal 
imitation and invention, neurophysiology of action-
perception schemes, discrimination of sound patterns, 
biomechanisms of sound production, and modalities of 
language production and perception. Examples of the 
FLB-conceptual-intentional system include theory of 
mind, the ability to acquire non-linguistic conceptual 
representations, referential vocal signals, imitation, and 
voluntary control of signal production (Hauser et  al. 
2002: 1573). The latter may all be understood as pos-
sible units of language evolution. Finally, Berwick and 
Chomsky (2016) especially point toward evo–devo mech-
anisms when they argue that the capacity to merge pos-
sibly results from a prolonged activation of an enhancer 
sequence that underlies the development of neural fiber 
tracts that connect dorsal and ventral brain areas.
In a very real sense, most evolutionary linguists are 
per definition Neodarwinian evolutionary epistemolo-
gists, because following Pinker and Bloom (1990), they 
have endorsed the view that language evolved by means of 
natural selection. Embracing universal Darwinism (Dawk-
ins 1983) or universal selectionism (Cziko 1995) has 
proven useful in evolutionary linguistics because schol-
ars have modeled how replicators (Szathmáry 2006) and 
memes of sociocultural and linguistic evolution, such as 
the lingueme (Croft 2000) become faithfully transmitted. 
Nonetheless, the approach has limitations because most 
linguistic units are not faithfully replicated. At most, they 
reproduce through social practices such as teaching and 
learning (Mesoudi and Whiten 2008), and cultural trans-
mission experiments have demonstrated that this transmis-
sion occurs via more loosely defined Darwinian principles 
(Steels 2011; Tamariz 2014; Tamariz and Kirby 2016). 
Most importantly, the scholars involved have tackled the 
question of transmission at an individual and group level.
But more mechanisms have been implicated. Schol-
ars have demonstrated that language diffusion occurs by 
drift (Jespersen 1909; Greenberg 1960; Sapir 1921), that 
language evolution/change can occur both slowly and 
rapidly (Gray and Joran 2000; Atkinson et  al. 2008), and 
that many traits associated with the biological capacity to 
evolve a particular language, are not adaptations, but exap-
tations (Gould and Vrba 1998; Tattersall 2014) or neutral 
traits (Kimura 1968). Some are even maladaptive. Our 
supra-laryngeal vocal tract, for example, might enable us to 
produce a rich vocal palate, but it also facilitates choking 
(Lieberman 2007).
A swift consideration of the literature, therefore, pro-
vides a series of possible units, levels, mechanisms, 
and hierarchies (Table  3). And as the brief exemplifica-
tion shows, also hierarchy theories are numerous, simply 
because our epistemologies can take on different view-
points of ontology. Amongst other, we can develop hierar-
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ecological and physical hierarchies (but for a more elabo-
rate view, see Gontier 2017).
Nonetheless, evolutionary linguists have often tackled 
core evolutionary epistemological questions in the margins 
of their research instead of bringing them to the forefront. 
Instead, they have given preference to theory formation. 
Such is understandable, because asking about units, lev-
els, and mechanisms, and establishing the hierarchy of lan-
guage-related phenomena is all but evident.
How, for example, do we study the evolution of the 
supra-laryngeal vocal tract (SVT) that enables speech? Do 
we reduce it to a genetic level and search for the genes that 
make up the SVT, or do we study the anatomy of the SVT, 
the brain regions that control it, or its products (sounds)? At 
present, scholars walk all research avenues, and all provide 
valuable data. The SVT furthermore is a compositional 
structure that is decomposable into sub-units, including the 
lips, teeth, palate, tongue, velum, epiglottis, pharynx, the 
hypoglossal canal and its nerves, and the hyoid bone. Here 
too, scientific practices demonstrate that all these structures 
can and have been studied individually, all somewhat trace 
back to genes and specific brain areas that control their 
function, and all underlie behaviors that are irreducible to 
genes. This necessitates a hierarchical understanding of the 
structures. And similarly, the SVT is but one subcompo-
nent of a larger phenomenon we call language. Language 
can therefore but be a super-unit that is itself decomposable 
into several sub-units.
All this implies unit-pluralism, level-pluralism, and 
mechanism-pluralism, and the question becomes how 
we can structure the data into an, or multiple hierarchies, 
because, as the middle column of Table  3 demonstrates, 
options are diverse.
4.2  The Three AEE-Heuristics that Enable 
an Identification, Examination and Evaluation 
of the Units, Levels and Evolutionary Mechanisms 
of LE
How then does AEE enable a structuring of the data? In 
what follows, we demonstrate how AEE can generate, 
constrain and help evaluate research avenues by follow-
ing three heuristics that help identify the units, levels, and 
mechanisms of LE.
AEE circumvents intentional definitions because it 
stands neutral toward language definitions, and it avoids 
intensional definitions of the units, levels, and mechanisms 
involved. Instead, it asks to demonstrate, ostensively, that 
an entity under examination is a unit by pointing out the 
level whereat and the mechanism whereby it evolves. AEE 
is a pragmatic way to unite the various datasets and it also 
enables one to distinguish windows from the actual phe-
nomena involved in LE. Successfully implementing the 
heuristics will furthermore provide better insight into how 
the hierarchies associated with LE take shape.
Suppose then that we have an x that is presumed to be 
relevant for LE. X is relevant for LE if and only if we can 
prove it is at minimum either a unit, level or mechanism 
of LE. The units, levels and evolutionary mechanisms that 
allow language to evolve can be found by following the 
heuristics set out in Table 4.
5  An In-Depth Analysis of the Unit-Heuristic
First, we give a full version of the unit-heuristic and then 
we walk through the heuristic point by point.
5.1  Full Version of the Unit-Heuristic
Table 5 gives an elaborate version of the unit-heuristic.
5.2  Walking Through the Heuristic
How then, can we investigate whether x is a unit of LE?
5.2.1  The Question Mark-Phase
(1) When we do not know without examination of x that 
it is a unit of LE, we recommend to try and prove that x is 
a unit, by going to the Yes-phase and answering questions 
2 and 3. As said, x is a unit of LE if one can minimally 
point out one level where x evolves (2), and one mecha-
nism whereby x evolves (3). In the uncertain situation, one 
example of either suffices to demonstrate that x is indeed 
a unit, and then you may move on to the yes-phase. When 
neither one level (2.a.) nor one mechanism (3.a.) are identi-
fiable, the heuristic directs you to the no-phase (9).
When uncertain about x, trying to prove the yes-phase 
is preferred over the no-phase (9.) because the no-phase 
asks whether x is a level and/or an evolutionary mechanism 
(9.a.). Identifying x as a level or a mechanism, however, 
does not a priori exclude x from being a unit. An organ-
ism may simultaneously function as a unit that evolves by 
means of natural selection at the level of the environment, 
and that same organism may be a level where units such as 
genes are targeted by selection.
5.2.2  The Yes-Phase
If you skipped the question mark-phase and immediately 
argued that x is a unit of LE, then this action is only justified 
if minimally one level (2.) and minimally one mechanism 
(3.) was identified where and whereby x evolves (because if 




Table 4  Abbreviated version of the unit, level and mechanism heuristics (read from left to right and top-down)
IS X A UNIT OF LE?




Where? Identify the 
level/s where x evolves
Not one level found? X is not a unit; Go to no.
One/multiple level/s?
(Justification)
How, by which mechanism/s did x evolve?
(Justification)
Since when? When did x first originate in time and when did x become a unit of LE?
How does x interact with 
other units? 
Is x divisible into one or more sub- or super-units? 
If so, are they also units in LE?
Is x also a level and/or 
mechanism?
? & yes: Go to the level and/or mechanism-heuristic.
How relevant is x? Is x sufficient and/or necessary for LE or for theories thereof?
N
O
If not a unit, is x a level
and/or a mechanism?
? or Yes: Go to the level and/or mechanism-heuristic.
No: Is x a window of LE? Yes: Treat x accordingly.
No: Treat x as irrelevant for LE.
IS X A LEVEL OF LE?






No units are identified? X is not a level; Go to no.
One/multiple unit/s?
(Justification)
By which/How many evolutionary mechanisms did 
the unit evolve at x? (Test)
What is the ontological
status of x?
Is x an abstract notion that facilitates theory formation, or an existing entity?
Since when? Locate the origin of x in time or indicate when it becomes necessary to invoke x as 
an abstract notion in LE theories.
How does x interact with 
other levels? 
Is x divisible into sub- or super-levels?
If so, are they also levels in LE?
Is x also a unit and/or 
mechanism? 
? & yes: Go to the unit and/or mechanism-heuristic.
How relevant is x? Is x sufficient and/or necessary for LE or for theories thereof?
N
O
If not a level, is x a unit
and/or mechanism?
? or Yes: Go to the unit and/or mechanism-heuristic.
No: Is x a window of LE? Yes: Treat x accordingly.
No: Treat x as irrelevant for LE.
IS X AN EVOLUTIONARY MECHANISM OF LE?




On how many units is x 
active?
Not one unit: x is not an evolutionary mechanism involved in LE.
One/multiple unit/s.
(Justification)
At how many levels is x active? (Test)
How does x work? What conditions need to be met for x to occur?
(Requires universal heuristics of the working order of the mechanism.)
Since when? Locate in time when these conditions are met regarding each unit and each level.
How does x interact with 
other mechanisms? 
Is x divisible into sub-or super-mechanism/s?
If so, are they also mechanisms of LE?
Is x also a unit and/or 
level?
? & yes: Go to the unit and/or level-heuristic.
How relevant is x? Is x sufficient and/or necessary for LE or for theories thereof?
N
O
If not a mechanism, is x a
unit and/or level? 
? or Yes: Go to the unit and/or level-heuristic.
No: Is x a window of LE? Yes: Treat x accordingly.
No: Treat x as irrelevant for LE.
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But during the yes-phase, research cannot end here, 
because x might be evolving by multiple mechanisms at 
multiple levels. A gene can simultaneously be targeted 
by selection at the genomic and the organismal level; or a 
gene might be evolving by drift at a genomic level, while it 
might become transmitted through hybridization.
Beyond identifying x as a unit, a series of other ques-
tions are generated by the heuristic that enable a more 
thorough examination and evaluation of the unit x. The 
yes-phase is therefore divided into three sub-phases: an 
identification-, a question generating and constraining-, 
and an evaluation-phase.
5.2.3  The Identification-Phase (2–3)
During the identification-phase, we ask where x evolves 
(leading to level-identification) and how x evolves (ena-
bling mechanism-identification), and as said, both ques-
tions need to be answered to prove or justify that x is a unit 
of LE. We now turn to these questions one by one.
(2) The where-question asks about the level or locus where 
x is a unit of LE. It is identifiable in two ways: either you 
investigate whether x is a unit at known levels of LE, or you 
identify new level/s where x evolves (by a certain mecha-
nism). Put negatively, x can only be excluded from being 
a unit of LE if it has been proven not to be a unit at every 
recognized level. Moreover, the status of “not being a LE-
unit” must be re-evaluated every time a new level is discov-
ered. Finally, identifying a level (2.c.) only partially justi-
fies that x is a unit, because also the mechanism/s whereby 
x evolves at that level need to be identified (3.).
During the identification-phase, you should aim at 
exhaustion and identify all levels where x evolves. When 
we cannot identify one level where x evolves, then x is not 
a unit (2.a.). When new levels are identified, these need to 
be examined independently from within the level-heuris-
tic (2.b.). As such, the unit-heuristic is not only a device 
designed to test or identify units, it additionally allows to 
identify new levels.
Regulatory genes, for example, are highly conserved 
throughout the genome, generally indicating strong selec-
tion pressures for preservation. The question is where, 
at what level/s such genes are targeted by selection. The 
FOXP2 gene (Lai 2000, 2001), for example, is a regula-
tory gene indicated to facilitate orofacial movements that 
underlie articulate speech, but it is also active during the 
formation of the heart and the gut. All might be levels, i.e. 
loci where the gene becomes targeted by selection. Proving 
that the FOXP2 gene is targeted by selection at the level 
of the gut, however, will not prove that the gene is a unit 
specifically involved in LE. For that, we should prove that 
it is targeted by selection at, let’s say, the level of “speech”, 
or the “SVT” that enables speech, or the “language brain 
regions” that control the movements of the SVT.
For one, this example demonstrates the need to develop 
adequate hierarchy theories whereby we classify data on 
units and levels, an issue we return to under question 5 of 
the heuristic. Secondly, it demonstrates that entities are 
often multifunctional. The FOXP2 gene might be evolving 
at both the level of the gut and the supra-laryngeal vocal 
tract, but these structures do not appear to entertain any 
direct relation, and the gene is probably regulating differ-
ent proteins at these different loci. This question on (func-
tional) variation is further analyzed under 4.
(3) The how-question asks about the mechanism/s whereby 
x evolves at each identified level. Here too, you can exam-
ine whether x evolves by known evolutionary mechanisms, 
or you can identify a new mechanism of LE that then needs 
to be tested from within the evolutionary mechanism-
heuristic (3.b.). Put negatively, a search for mechanisms is 
only exhausted when x has been examined to evolve by all 
known mechanisms involved in LE.
X possibly evolves by one (3.c.) or more (3.d.) evolu-
tionary mechanisms, at one (2.c.) or more (2.d.) levels lead-
ing to the following four possible outcomes:
1. The unit x evolves by one mechanism at one level 
(3.c.1.), and then we need to explain why there is 
mechanism- and level-exclusivity;
2. X evolves by one mechanism at multiple levels (3.c.2.), 
and then we need to explain how one unit evolves at 
multiple levels by the same mechanism as well as how 
the different levels interact (2.b.1.)—this relates to 
multilevel evolution theory;
3. X evolves by multiple mechanisms at one level (3.c.3.), 
and then we need to explain how different mechanisms 
act simultaneously on the same unit at one level, as 
well as how the different mechanisms interact (if they 
do)—this relates to multi-mechanism evolution theory;
4. X evolves by multiple mechanisms at multiple levels 
(3.c.4.), and then we need to examine how different 
mechanisms act simultaneously on the same unit at 
multiple levels, as well as how the different mecha-
nisms and the different levels interact with one another 
regarding this unit (if they do)—this requires both 
multi-mechanism and multilevel evolutionary theory.
 Pointing, for example, is often implicated in gesture-
first or multimodal theories on LE. Butterworth (2003), 
has hypothesized that pointing is genetically determined 
and that it evolves by means of natural selection; Leavens 
et al.  (2005) argue that pointing is part of the phenotypic, 
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behavioral repertoire of primates and that diverse envi-
ronmental stimuli trigger the behavior epigenetically; and 
Tomasello (2000) understands it as a form of cultural learn-
ing enabled by the ratchet effect. If either one of them is 
correct, and the other is wrong, this would exemplify 
outcome 1, and then pointing either evolves at a genetic, 
a behavioral or a cultural level, respectively by natural 
selection, epigenetics or the ratchet effect. If all are right, 
their theories on pointing exemplify outcome 4, and then 
we need to explain how pointing evolves at all these levels 
simultaneously, and by a diversity of mechanisms.
My aim here is not to solve the issues raised. The authors 
that make the claims are better able to do so. Instead, the 
heuristic provides a structure wherein we can frame these 
questions. Answers will require applied evolutionary epis-
temology that combines unit-, level-, and mechanism plu-
rality with hierarchy theory.
5.2.4  The Question Generating and Constraining-Phase 
(4–7)
When questions 2 and 3 are answered, you have identified 
x as a unit of LE. At this point, the heuristic becomes an 
investigative tool and provides you with questions that sys-
tematically examine when x evolved, whether x portrays 
variation, which variations are relevant to LE, and how x 
situates itself within the evolutionary hierarchy that under-
lies LE.
(4) The first question that is generated is the since when 
question. Having proven that x is a unit of LE, it becomes 
necessary to ask if x, from its origin onward, has always 
been a unit of LE. Do this by first locating the origin of x 
in time (4.a.), and secondly by examining if this date coin-
cides with the origin of x as a LE unit for each level where 
it is a unit (4.b.).
This approach allows you to detect variations (in both 
function and form), and it helps to solve ongoing debates 
on whether x is an adaptation “for” LE (Dawkins 1982; 
Pinker and Bloom 1990) or an exaptation (Gould and 
Vrba 1998; Hauser et al. 2002; Tattersall 2014). When the 
date at which x originated differs from the date at which x 
became a unit in LE, then x is an exaptation. X is an adap-
tation only when the dates converge (see Gontier 2006 for 
a discussion).
All mammals, birds, and amphibians, for example, pos-
sess tongues, but the tongue cannot be a unit in LE from 
the time of amphibians onward, since they do not display 
language (although many have complex communication 
systems).
Recognizing that language is a heterogeneous phenom-
enon and thus that it involves a multiplicity of units, levels, 
and mechanisms, necessitates us to consider the dynamics 
of these elements. Not all are present, all the time and eve-
rywhere, and we need to find a way to cartography these 
dynamics. Question 4.c. digs further by asking whether x, 
from the moment it became a unit of LE onward, has con-
stantly remained a unit of LE. When we cannot straight-
forwardly provide an answer (4.c.1.), it is recommended 
to try and prove that it has inconstantly been a unit of LE 
(4.c.1.1.). One counterexample suffices to prove that x has 
been an inconstant unit.
Demonstrating that x is an inconstant unit of LE entails 
demonstrating one of three things (4.c.2.): either the level/s 
where x evolves are inconstantly present; or the evolution-
ary mechanism/s whereby x evolves are inconstantly active 
upon the unit; or both the level/s and the evolutionary 
mechanism/s are inconstant. If either of these three options 
is the case, the variations need to be specified (4.c.2.1.). It 
thus needs to be specified when x was not a unit at a certain 
level and again became a unit (if it did); and when x did not 
evolve by a certain mechanism, and again evolved by it (if 
it did).
The FOXP2 gene was subjected to a selective sweep 
(Enard et  al. 2002), but how did it evolve before this 
sweep? At present, we don’t know. In general, selection 
only happens when there is a struggle. When the environ-
mental conditions become less harsh, selection might turn 
into drift and any ongoing selection process will be destabi-
lized. And a lexicon, for example, might evolve at the level 
of the population when population size makes it necessary 
to communicate adequately to as many as possible (Dunbar 
1998), but the environmental conditions might not always 
have allowed for big groups. What happened if over certain 
periods of time the group became smaller, due to e.g. gla-
ciation events?
Specifying these variations in time will also enable 
scholars to identify elements that used to be units of LE, 
but have since stopped to be units (either because the unit 
x no longer exists, or because x is no longer a unit of LE). 
And this implies that studying LE does not necessarily end 
when all current units of LE are exposed.
Each variation in time of the unit needs to be treated as 
a possible different unit, from unit onward (4.c.2.1.1.), and 
it is interesting to investigate whether each variation has 
likewise been a unit in other kinds of evolution (4.c.2.1.2.). 
This will further enable to make clear whether x has been a 
unit that arose specifically in a LE context or not.
The origin of the FOXP2 gene (Lai et  al. 2000, 2001; 
Vargha Khadem et  al. 2005), for example, outdates the 
origin of our species. It is a very old gene that arose from 
opisthokonts (animals and fungi) onward and different spe-
cies, such as mice, song birds, and chimpanzees, exhibit 
species-specific variations. The gene can evidently not be 




species. Nonetheless, it might be a unit in mice commu-
nication because it has been proven to underlie their ultra-
sonic vocalizations, and the gene is active during songbird 
learning (see Berwick and Chomsky 2016 for an overview). 
Research originally suggested that the human-specific vari-
ant of the FOXP2 gene originated some 200,000 years ago 
(Enard 2002; Zhang et  al. 2002), and in comparison with 
the chimpanzee orthologue, it underwent 2 specific amino 
acid changes that have since been the target of positive 
selection. Krause et  al. (2007) later showed that Nean-
derthals shared the same variation, and conjectured that 
the variant might be shared by both species’ last common 
ancestor, pushing the origin of the amino acid substitutions 
back to 300–400,000 years ago. It is this variation common 
to both species that is likely involved in the evolution of 
orofacial movements that facilitate articulate speech (for a 
discussion, see Gontier 2008). The evolution of ultrasonic 
communication in mice, or songbird learning, are examples 
of other kinds of evolution where variants of the gene serve 
as a unit. As such, the heuristic enables one to distinguish 
these kinds of evolution from the ones actually involved in 
LE.
Similarly, the voice, for example, might be a unit of 
natural selection at the level of speech, and it might simul-
taneously be a unit of sexual selection at the level of the 
species. But the voice is irrelevant for the evolution of 
opposable thumbs.
If it has been impossible to specify variations, x has con-
stantly been a unit of LE (4.c.3.1.). Or, stated otherwise, 
it is justified to call x a constant unit (if you skipped the 
question mark-phase and went immediately to yes), only 
if it can be proven that the level/s and the mechanism/s 
were constant (4.c.4.). Also in this case, it is interesting to 
see whether x has been a unit in other kinds of evolution 
(4.c.4.1).
(5) The next question continues to tackle the problem of 
variation, not by investigating the continuous nature of the 
unit, but by asking how the unit x interacts with other units 
of LE. Answers require the establishment of a hierarchy of 
units. The first sub-question asks whether the unit is divis-
ible into several sub-units (5.a.). If so, these sub-units need 
to be investigated as possible independent units from within 
the unit-heuristic (5.a.1.); if not, they need to be examined 
as possible units of other kinds of evolution (5.a.1.2.).
Again turning to the FOXP2 gene, this gene encodes 
for the FOXP2 protein that contains the fixed forkhead-
box DNA-binding domain responsible for gene regula-
tion, as well as a large and highly variable polyglutamine 
tract, a zinc finger, and a leucine zipper. The latter are sub-
units of the protein (and thus the gene), and so we need 
to investigate these as possible units of LE in their own 
right, and how they are possibly involved in other kinds of 
evolution.
It is especially the FOX domain that is of interest to 
evolutionary linguists because mutations in this region 
link to orofacial deficits required for articulate speech. In 
non-pathological individuals, the transcription factor reg-
ulates expression of the CNTNAP2 gene that encodes for 
neurexin, a presynaptic protein involved in connecting neu-
rons at the synapses; the CTBP1 gene that encodes for a 
C-terminal-binding protein 1 that functions as a repressor 
by switching genes of; and the SRPX2 gene that underlies 
synapse formation in the cerebral cortex. All sub-units 
of the FOXP2 protein thus appear to be units involved in 
brain evolution in our and other species. Mutations in the 
CNTNAP2 gene are implicated in Gilles de la Tourette syn-
drome (Verkerk et  al. 2003), schizophrenia, and autism. 
Variations of the polyglutamine tract are implicated in 
speech sound disorder in Chinese populations (Zhao et al. 
2010). SRPX2 reduction is linked to impairments in ultra-
sonic vocalization in mice (Sia et al. 2013). Following the 
heuristic provides a useful tool for identifying these vari-
ations, examining their relevance for LE, and identifying 
which are possibly involved in other kinds of evolution.
The second sub-question asks whether the unit under 
examination is absorbable into one or more super-units 
(5.b.), and if so, whether these, in turn, are independent 
units of LE (5.b.1.), or other kinds of evolution (5.b.1.2.).
To continue our example of the FOXP2 gene (Lai et al. 
2000), we know that it is located on chromosome 7 (7q31, 
at the SPCH1 locus). Chromosome 7 is a super-unit where 
the FOXP2 gene is part of, simply because it contains 
numerous genes, and the heuristic, therefore, recommends 
an independent investigation of it. This, in turn, will justify 
a full decomposition of the chromosome into its various 
genes (its sub-units). Chromosome 7, in turn, forms part of 
the human genome that can be regarded as an example of 
a super-unit. A mere examination of the FOXP2 gene as a 
possible unit of LE, thus justifies a full screening and inde-
pendent investigation of the genome for possible units of 
LE; and it enables a better categorization of which sub- and 
super-units are actually relevant for LE and what entities 
are part of other kinds of evolution (such as the evolution 
of the brain, synaptic connections, ultrasonic vocalization, 
etc.).
The question on sub- and super-units furthermore helps 
in establishing a workable hierarchy of units that link epis-
temology (theory formation) to ontology (reality). Units 
are best regarded as Matruskas, structures that are both 
decomposable into smaller substructures and composable 
into larger superstructures. Asking about sub- and super-
units will expose new units of LE that in turn need to be 
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investigated independently, from unit onward.  For sure, this 
is not an easy task, but it is nonetheless a necessary one.
Sign language, for example, is decomposable into hand 
gestures, facial gestures etc., and grouped into non-verbal, 
natural languages that differ from spoken ones. But where 
do we classify a behavior such as pointing? For one, point-
ing is demonstrably present in primate communication 
systems, although functional variation occurs (Tomasello 
2000). Secondly, scholars who endorse multi-modal theo-
ries on LE or gesture-first theories (Corballis 2002; Leav-
ens et  al. 2005;  Zlatev 2014) often implicitly understand 
or classify pointing, as a (sub-)unit of non-verbal commu-
nicative behavior. Non-verbal communicative behavior, in 
turn, might be part of a (type of) protolanguage (Bicker-
ton 1990). But, and thirdly, pointing may also be consid-
ered a (sub-)unit in co-verbal gesturing, and, as the name 
implies, co-verbal gesturing implies the accompaniment of 
speech (Goldin-Meadow 2007). As such, pointing can be a 
unit in primate communication (Leavens et al. 2005; Toma-
sello 2000), protolanguage (Wacewicz and Zywiczynski 
in press) and co-verbal gesturing (Goldin-Meadow 2007). 
These might be considered different levels where pointing 
as a unit evolves, or they might altogether be considered 
different kinds of evolution because their evolutionary tra-
jectories might be divergent instead of unilineal.
Pointing-behavior itself is also variable. Apes point 
with all fingers extended, while humans point canonically, 
with only the index-finger extended (Butterworth 2003). 
Scholars distinguish “imperative” pointing, from “declara-
tive” pointing, and Tomasello (2000) argues that only the 
latter demonstrates the presence of theory of mind, which 
is refuted by Leavens et al. (2005). In conflicts like these, 
the heuristic advices to treat all different types as varia-
tions and to investigate these variations independently as 
different units, that possibly evolve at different levels, and 
that beyond LE, are possibly involved in different kinds of 
evolution.
(6, 7) Another query is whether the unit x is conjointly a 
level (6) or a mechanism (7) of LE. Especially when the 
unit is divisible into sub-units, and when the unit itself is 
thus a super-unit, the latter might be a level or locus where 
these sub-units evolve. Pointing, for example, might be a 
level where theory of mind evolves, because it serves as 
a vehicle where the trait can become environmentally 
expressed. Or, focusing on its particular sub-units, it can 
be the locus where index-finger extension becomes the tar-
get of a certain mechanism. And the genome, chromosome 
7, the FOXP2 gene, and the FOXP2 protein, for example, 
might (depending upon the hierarchy theory used) all be 
considered levels where the FOX region (the transcrip-
tion factor) evolves. Such needs to be investigated from 
the level-heuristic onward (6.a.) and will depend upon the 
identification of specific units that evolve at these levels by 
specific mechanisms.
In so far as the transcription factor regulates gene expres-
sion, it might even be considered a mechanism of LE, but 
such needs to be studied independently from within the 
mechanism-heuristic (7.a.) and will depend upon finding 
and defining stable conditions whereby the gene induces 
change.
Here too, the same criteria define levels and mecha-
nisms: if something is a level, it means that units can be 
identified as well as evolutionary mechanisms that are 
active upon those units, at those levels. Mechanisms are 
only mechanisms if they are active upon units at levels. 
If uncertain, the test begins from (respectively) level and 
mechanism onward. For a full discussion, see Gontier 
(2017).
5.2.5  The Evaluation-Phase
The yes-phase enabled you to identify x as a unit, and it 
has allowed you to generate and constrain specific research 
avenues. Now you may evaluate the obtained information 
and investigate what role this information plays in a unify-
ing theory on LE.
(8) The final step to take when x is indeed a unit, is to 
investigate how relevant the unit x is or has been in LE by 
asking whether the unit is sufficient (8.a.) and/or necessary 
(8.b.) for language to evolve. These questions are not raised 
to investigate what is “essential” to LE. Rather, they serve 
to evaluate the importance of the unit  and they enable to 
get an overview of the results that have been achieved by 
examining this unit. The questions also enable an assesse-
ment of  the work that still needs to be done.
Suppose, for example, that there exist an all-encompass-
ing Language Acquisition Device (-module/gene, Chom-
sky 1965) that is a unit of LE. Examining this LAD from 
within the above heuristic (as well as all its sub-units—if 
there are such sub-units) will, for the most part, have solved 
the problem of how language evolved. If, on the other hand, 
a gene or module for “Merge” is found, it will only explain 
recursion typical of universal grammar and mathematics. 
Or, if the human-specific shape and position of the tongue 
have been demonstrated to be units of LE, this will leave 
the researcher with the task of examining numerous other 
units, before he will solve the problem at hand.
If the unit x is sufficient for LE to occur (8.a.1.), it needs 
to be explained why there are other units involved (if there 
are). It seems likely that there does not exist such a sin-




insufficient (8.a.2.), it needs to be explained where it falls 
short in explaining LE.
If the unit x is necessary for LE (8.b.1.), x needs to be 
treated as a general (and perhaps even universal) unit of LE. 
This means that the unit x must have been present, at least 
during a specific period in time, during LE. And, important 
from an epistemological perspective, every theory that tries 
to explain LE needs to consider the evolution of this unit. 
If x is unnecessary for LE to occur (8.b.2.), neither of the 
two points are required. Rather, the unit may be regarded 
as peculiar to LE in general or as a particularity of a certain 
(aspect of) the evolution of (a specific) language/s, and it 
must thus not necessarily form part of a general theory on 
LE.
5.2.6  The No-Phase
(9) If x is not a unit of LE, you need to investigate whether 
x is either a mechanism or a level of LE, and if neither, 
whether it is a window on LE (9.b.). A window of LE is 
defined by Botha (2006: 132) as a phenomenon that is 
itself distinct from LE, but that nonetheless enables to draw 
inferences on the origin of language. Windows differ from 
the actual units, levels, and mechanisms of LE, but they 
provide insight into possible contexts of use of the units.
If the unit x is conjointly a level or a mechanism (9.a.), 
x needs to be treated accordingly, from within the heuris-
tics presented in Table 4. When x is not a level, mechanism 
or window, x should be treated as irrelevant for LE until 
proven otherwise (9.b.2.).
6  Prospects
The above demonstrates how an applied evolutionary epis-
temological approach can help evolutionary linguistics. It 
formulates new research questions and it shows how we 
can examine existing data for new insights on LE. The 
application of AEE to as complex and heterogeneous a 
phenomenon as LE demonstrates how evolutionary epis-
temology itself can and must be extended into a method-
ology wherein not only multilevel selection is recognized, 
but where we come to terms with unit, level, and mecha-
nism pluralism. Hence, we need to develop a hierarchical 
framework that allows us to search for the many different 
(super- and sub-)units, (super- and sub)levels, and (super- 
and sub-)mechanisms and we need to conceptualize their 
interaction.
It is clear that LE, as well as language itself is, at best, 
fuzzy, and no single unit, level or mechanism will do. The 
merits of the heuristics developed here is that they nei-
ther require intentional definitions of what language is nor 
functional definitions of what language evolved for. Both 
definitional types are rather central in current theorizing, 
with the Chomskian tradition focusing on the former and 
the Neodarwinian on the latter (see Gontier 2006 for a dis-
cussion). Here, these questions are circumvented. X is a 
unit if it evolves at a level by a certain mechanism; x is a 
level if certain units evolve at x because they are subjected 
to certain mechanisms; and x is a mechanism if it is active 
upon certain units at certain levels. Intensional definitions 
that explain the nature of units, levels and mechanisms can, 
at best, only be specified once all units, levels and mecha-
nisms are identified. Then we can investigate what all have 
in common (if they indeed have something in common), 
and differentiate essential from accidental properties.
The epistemic questions central to this approach are 
how, where, since when, how many, etc. Not one of them 
makes it necessary to think teleological. Especially the 
issue of time and dating (the since when question) is high-
lighted in the heuristic. Evolution always occurs within 
a certain time frame for the whole concept of evolution 
implies that something comes into being that did not exist 
at a previous moment in time. Coming to terms with plu-
rality necessitates investigations into the dynamics of when 
and how long and how many times units, levels, and mech-
anisms result in language, because there is no good reason 
to assume homogeneity and endurance or stability of all 
elements involved. This is especially the case when we sur-
pass the genetic realm and move on to cultural levels. The 
heuristics will also deliver knowledge on who evolved lan-
guage, and where this evolution occurred.
It is important to note that the heuristics are not merely 
devices that categorize the current data available on the 
units, levels, and mechanisms of LE. Rather, the heuristics 
are genuine investigative tools.
The heuristics furthermore systematize, generate, con-
strain, and allow you to evaluate the different research 
avenues. The search engines provide an answer to the ques-
tion: when do we stop looking for new units/ when can we 
assume to have found all of them? The answer is that you 
can stop looking for new units:
1. When no new units can be identified that are subjected 
to evolutionary mechanisms at certain levels;
2. When the division or absorption of known units into 
sub- or super-units cannot identify new units of LE;
3. When all identified levels have been, after conclusive 
examination, included or excluded as units or mecha-
nisms; and
4. When all identified evolutionary mechanisms have 
been, after conclusive examination, included or 
excluded as units or levels.
It is amazing how simple the different questions can 
be framed, and how difficult it is to provide an answer 
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to every single one of them. It needs to be emphasized 
that every single question raised by the heuristic regard-
ing a certain x that might be involved in LE, involves an 
individual research project. Nonetheless, all these dif-
ferent research routes can be brought together into one 
all-encompassing research plan. At the onset, the focus 
should lie at sub-units, sub-levels and sub-mechanisms 
and the more knowledge we have of these, the more we 
can build “the big picture” by investigating super-units, 
super-levels and super-mechanisms. This will naturally 
bring forth hierarchies and over time, consensus on the 
ontological layeredness might be reached.
The heuristics will only function properly when data-
bases of the units, levels and mechanisms, and the hierar-
chies they form, are developed that are accessible for eve-
ryone (Gontier 2010a, b, 2012). AI and the internet could 
play a major role here. This might sound like a huge 
amount of work, but evolutionary biologists have for 
many years now, started to gather their data into genome 
and protein banks that are freely accessible for everyone. 
Scholars are more and more able to process large data-
sets, not in the least because of progress made within bio-
informatics approaches. In this regard, a recent initiative 
should be mentioned called D-Place (Kirby et al. 2016). 
This is a databank that aims to link cultural information 
to language phylogenies and to geographic locations and 
environmental features. Such a database could also func-
tion to identify and store the units, levels and mecha-
nisms of LE.
When natural history scholars just started the investiga-
tion into the origin and evolution of language, they first and 
foremost focused on theory formation, and a race began 
over which theory was more plausible than another, but 
most ended up as just-so stories. Today, due to the large 
datasets available to us, we have come to realize that one 
person cannot develop one all-encompassing theory, and 
scientists are more willing and able to collaborate. Identify-
ing units, levels, and mechanisms of evolution will depend 
upon consensus views formulated by the community, and it 
will be a challenge to get things organized accordingly.
Once the heuristics should start to get implemented, it 
might be possible to also develop smaller heuristics that 
can function as search engines that point out recurring pat-
terns or perhaps even “universals”. Such universals might 
include clusters, that demonstrate that certain units always 
co-evolve, and a specific unit might not evolve in the pres-
ence of another (speech versus gesture, for example). A 
certain unit can perhaps always evolve when it is subjected 
to mechanisms x, y and z, regardless of the level/s. Or a 
certain group of mechanisms might always work together 
in (an aspect of) LE. Such are possibilities, that will highly 
likely be made clairvoyant when the heuristics become 
implemented.
Scientists are doers, while this work is written from a 
philosophical and thus theoretical perspective, and my aim 
is to focus on the underlying epistemology that grounds and 
justifies the steps taken along the way.
Finally, it needs to be noted that the heuristics do not 
mimic how language evolved. Thus, it is not because the 
heuristics are algorithms that I assume that language 
evolved algorithmically. Rather, these algorithms are 
argued to be a “how to study LE”, they provide a manner 
whereby we can break into the evolutionary events.
This approach is characterized by first dividing the 
research subject into parts; subsequently studying the parts 
independently, thirdly studying the relation between the 
parts; and fourthly, by justifying, confirming and by try-
ing to falsify every single step along the way. This does not 
imply that I assume that the sum total of the parts equals 
the whole because fifthly, we should also investigate how 
the combination of parts results in characteristics that are 
irreducible to those parts. Most evolutionary processes are 
characterized by such emerging events.
Whether the heuristics will actually provide all the rel-
evant data on how language evolved (how the units, levels 
and mechanisms evolved, interact, etc.), and thus whether it 
will enable us to build one single all-encompassing theory 
on LE, is a question that I cannot answer at present. I am 
convinced, though, that it will take us a long way down the 
road.
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